what are the 7 warfighting functions

[xix] The idea that one can tell at a glance what needs to be done and, although usually applied to looking at terrain, some, including Clausewitz, have used it to describe something beyond just terrain. Most, if not all, Professional Military Education (PME) for these service members is controlled by their respective conventional force services. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the forces integrity and combat power. I dont ever remember reading anything where General Lee thought he could defeat and outright destroy the Army of the Potomac so his chosen course of action was one based on influencing the power base, the northern citizenry correct? The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires through the targeting process. One way arguably leads towards relatively bigger budgets, more technology and platforms, and more intertwining of systems and processes with conventional forces. The offense cannot sustain itself indefinitely. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Today, we are going to discuss the Army Warfighting Functions. Reading your comments combined with RantCorp and Carl I believe in many ways you all are saying the same thing but maybe at a different level. b. This website uses cookies to improve your experience. A warfighting function (WFF) is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. The CF and SOF officers both operate in "human domains" (can we retire this term, as it seems specious at best?) The memoir covers the period from about 1941 to 1973. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have a problem: in order to be more effective in the human domain we have to paradoxically dump the concept. Similarly, what is Marine Corps doctrine? Overthrow a resisting local government that is standing in the way of where the United States wants to go and how it wants to get there or. Why the seven warfighting functions are important: Obtain maximum impact when we harmonize all warfighting functions to accomplish the desired strategic objective in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties, Unit 2: Basic Kinesiology and Biomechanics, Unit 1: Hypertrophy and Adaptations to Streng, Edge Reading, Writing and Language: Level C, David W. Moore, Deborah Short, Michael W. Smith, Literature and Composition: Reading, Writing,Thinking, Carol Jago, Lawrence Scanlon, Renee H. Shea, Robin Dissin Aufses, The Language of Composition: Reading, Writing, Rhetoric, Lawrence Scanlon, Renee H. Shea, Robin Dissin Aufses, Utah Real Estate Exam Prep Practice Exam 3. Doing the SF legacy mission with none of the high selectivity. A. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience. "I did not want to recall how many negative comments were made by countless officers about how stupid the insurgents were when in fact they are still in the fight and we are long gone from Iraq.". Youve pointed out that in the recent past, US Forces chose to ignore many open source TTPs that the terrorists have put in front of our very noses in such highly visible places such as YouTube and the internet. Just how many deploying BCT personnel fully understood the fighting tactics being used by the various Sunni, Shia, and AQI personnel ---did the Army via PME every have classes on this topic? Trusting a subordinate to plan and execute a mission objective enhances efficiency and places the U.S. at an advantage against its near-peer rivals. [xli] If SOF is to be successful at the operational and higher tactical levels, absent a personnel system that allows for flexibility and mission focus, we must incorporate at the very least a rigorous testing and experimentation program to assist us in finding the right tools and philosophical approach for operating in the human domain. Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.. This requires that we facilitate (1) the unhinging of these states and societies from their current and often age-old way of life and way of governance and (2) the attachment of these countries and populations to ways of life and ways of governance which are more similiar to our own. I have read and heard many who claim that the Army Warfighting Functions just create more red-tape and are not needed. I would put forward the idea that once a society adopts agriculture, at no time in its history henceforth does it exist without an economic elite and "the rest". B. flower cultivation was indicative of a society with leisure time. Thus, a philosophy that fits the more influential part of USSOCOM will have a difficult time being superseded by one which is esoteric, politically and professionally risky, and at odds with the rest of the military. [xxxii] And what were really talking about is internalized social change. I think is what Robert has been saying in a number of comments. Will any of these ideas help us to help "them" (pro-westernizing governments v. their resistant populations -- or -- pro-westernizing populations v. their resistant governments) overcome the turmoil and chaos (state failure, insurgencies, rebellion, crime, etc.) If two things dont alert us to the possibility that there could be something fundamentally wrong, then possibly nothing will. If we would have "understood" the Iraqi insurgency we actually would have seen the strategy being used vs only the symptoms ie the battle field tactics. It reminds me of the old WWII poster loose lips sinks ships. These advocates recommended the adoption of critical realism, multi-paradigmatic frames and the like. Upon promulgation of Marine Corps Officers are power point deep on their MDMP- it is fill-in-the-blank thinking- if you can call that "thinking"- since much of it is copied/pasted from higher's OPORDs. As usual there are a multitude of reasons. Even our own COIN doctrine- which implies that that type of activity is counterproductive, cannot rescue us from the technically rational system, of which it is, ultimately, also a part of. Thru the same lens they would have recognized what events indicate discipline and control and what events reflect anxiety, panic, fear and hysteria. IA also includes the sub-function Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). In the dynamic environment of LSCO, self-reliance and aggressive action are key. c. And know the kind of war that one is embarked upon. Our group believing that we might have made some progess in this, our generational project. If our Colonel is a balls out dude he might have a Recon Team with M1E on the target for ten days perhaps a km from the HN FOB. In some aspects the Civilian Defense groups are forcing the military and federal police to start offenses against some of the TCOs but it should be noted that the military and federal police have been are to a degree also corrupted by the TCOs.

or to paraphrase an Old Prussian, everything in the human domain is simple, but in the human domain even the simplest thing is complex.
. [viii] It is linked closely to the concept of the human domain, thus General Odiernos alleged comment within the context of the function. Which of the following is the world's largest single trading entity? When all came back in I was chastised for not running to the bunkers---my response was they were over 500 meters away and walking away from the initial impact point---a lot of dumb looks and a few questions as to what I meant by "walking" rounds and walking away from the impact point and how did I know it was 500 meters---this was 2005/2006 and I am betting it has not improved much since then. ~ Army U Press. Atahualpa revealed the location of the treasure to Pizarro, and Pizarro promptly executed the ruler and seized control of Cuzco, the Inca capital. What was it we missed in our estimates of the enemy meaning long term they were finished (was not the surge success an indicator that they were finished) ---even though we got the indigenous side IE Iraqi security forces human domain right or at least we thought right. [vi] In almost every meeting the author has attended on the 7th WfF, this anecdote is repeated, so even if GEN Odierno never said it, it has become part of the institutional narrative that he did. Warfighting functions and the dependability of knowledge. This process is ongoing and commanders use tasks in: to obtain this intelligence. Entire tribes vanished as smallpox, scarlet fever, and influenza decimated the native population of the Americas. It is also the means of focusing [xviii] Positivism is a philosophical approach that assumes an objective world in all aspects and that humans can discover that objective world through the scientific method. The most obvious way to seize and maintain the initiative is to strike first and keep striking. I know on some level it is important to teach the current doctrine. I think there needs to be some re-evaluation about these issues. As part of capacity building, engagement with Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) may form part of the CIMIC aspect of the IA WFF area of responsibility. After all, there are many examples in our own history where military commanders considered the population [or human domain as we call it now?] The purpose of the Fires WFF is to engage threat elements with lethal and less-lethal joint fires and effects, usually in coordination with manoeuvring ground forces (M2 WFF). For them, uncertainty is a threat; its admission a sign of weakness. That globalization is adding echelons of wealth concentration doesn't necessarily mean something "new" is happening. Grant---I think part of the current issue inside SF is a distinct lack of UW experience passed on from the 60/70s to the Groups having to just survive in order to rebuild. The information warfighting function provides the Army with a method to integrate these critical capabilities and help drive a change in the self-limiting centralization of IRCs when able. Or, 2. THEN the IED game got serious as it was the Duke vs a thinking/adapting UW team meaning once they understood jamming principles they simply starting moving the trigger away from the IED in order to figure out the jamming distance which took about ten days of real attempts to figure it out and then they were off and running again. We Westerners suffer from the belief that everyone is just like us. It is comparative to threat elements therefore includes actions to reduce the enemys freedom of manoeuvre. But we try. For me, everything is worth considering but I'm flexible. This human domain/participatory observation concept looks like it is to be accomplished in times of peace (today and the immediate future?) Also let me suggest that our enemies may have a better understanding of our political objective -- and, thus, the war that we and they are embarked upon -- than do many of our leaders and soldiers. This goes back to your comments concerned SW vs what I call the glorious kick down the door mentality. Take the LeT fighters in Bombay. The HTS was a massively costly program for both the US Army and the taxpayer ---was a total waste of money---ie the Awakening was generated by AQI forking the Sunni insurgency not by anything Gen. P or Nagel did or what HTS provided in many badly written reports. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. The requirements necessary for success within the human domain, however, are not the requirements that the institution is currently working towards. Others, more inclined toward and adept at reflection-in-action, nevertheless feel profoundly uneasy because they cannot say what they know how to do, cannot justify its quality or rigor.. But rather the wholistic meaning that an educated person has studied the full range of human knowledge and has (formally or informally) developed the ability to be informed by that knowledge as they apply it in their endeavors, be they economic or professional. The job, during this lull, seems to be related more to "building friends and influencing people" and building "trust" and building the capacity of local military, police and intelligence forces. This handbook borrowed much of its concepts from the Armys Design Methodology (ADM). Thus they are able to remain mission-focused and results-oriented. The U.S. military has become more professional, more centrally-managed, more technologically-enhanced, and more regimented since the ramp-up for the Cold War saddled the American people with a relatively large professional force. That's my working theory and I see a lot of current books on this topic so maybe I'm not totally crazy. (take it, figure out what to do with it, apply it). [xxxix] To engage most effectively within the human domain- our SW forces should be supported with an education and training institution second to none. When COL Chamberlin ordered a bayonet charge from the defense he was banking on the fact that it would cause confusion in the enemy conducting the charge. In Evaluating Immunities before a Special Tribunal for Aggression Against Ukraine, the Type of Tribunal Matters, Chinas Ferry Tale Taiwan Invasion Plan Is A Legal Nightmare, China Maritime Report No. I was just going to pull that quote for another comment thread. The goal is not more money, more missions, or more personnel. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Its antithesis is post-positivism, or, as many prefer to call it- especially within the military- critical realism. What happens when the local populations finally after being brutually held down and are afraid to even come out of their houses DOES come out of their houses fully armed and willing to defend their villages/towns/cities? Herein, we must be prepared to deal with the vastly increased and very broad and very deep chaos (exs: rebellions, insurgencies, genocide, famine, increased crime, etc., etc., etc.) For purposes of the definition, the term enemy includes the entire range of threats and the term terrain includes weather. That the autodefensas exist and have the capacity to organize armed resistance to TCO's does not mean that they should be helped (timely

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